In addition to examining long-term funding alternatives for regional Bay Area homeless activities, the charge for this study included an examination of alternative regional homeless governance structures.
This section proposes principles that are important for a long-term homeless governance system. It describes the existing BARI structure in relation to these principals. The report then examines alternative regional homeless governance structures which are being used in other parts of the country-Dade-Miami County’s homeless trust fund, Los Angeles joint-power agreement establishing a homeless services authority, Metropolitan Denver’s regional continuum-of-care plan, and Seattle-based ARCH’s sub-regional housing/homeless trust fund. The purpose of this review is to see if practices other regions are following might be incorporated in the Bay Area. ABAG has established affiliates to provide several different kinds of services to Bay Area governments on a coordinated basis. This report also discusses the possibility of establishing a regional homeless ABAG affiliate.
Retain or Adapt the Existing BARI Governance Structure
One approach is to retain the existing BARI governance structure unchanged. If it’s not broken don’t fix it. A decision to do this should be based on an analysis of how well the existing structure satisfies the underlying principles outlined above and evidence that the way the BARI governance structure is performing at least as well as homeless governance structures in other regions.
The Regional Task Force (RTF) is BARI’s de facto board of directors. They make policy and funding decisions. One question is whether the size and composition of the RTF is appropriate. The RTF was designed in 1995 to represent major stakeholders in the region. It consists of 27 members. County and city selection committees from the 9 counties and 5 large cities in the region each select one member of the RTF. The RTF includes representatives of the key federal agencies involved with homelessness, business, labor, foundations, philanthropy, and homeless or formerly homeless people.
The size of BARI’s RTF is average for other regions. A detailed description of the composition of other regions’ governing bodies is contained in Appendix C. LAHSA has a 10 member board; MDHI 38. Miami-Dade County has the same number of members on their governing board as BARI. The number of representatives on the BARI RTF strikes a reasonable balance between LAHSA’s leaner board composed entirely of local elected officials and MDHI’s very large board. LAHSA’s board consists of 5 county supervisors and 5 members city councilpeople. Such a small and political governing board seems less suited to the Bay Area political culture than the existing BARI board. Denver and Miami-Dade County have boards representing similar interest to the BARI board, though both have stronger business representation. It does not appear that the size or composition of BARI’s RTF needs to be changed.
Another governance issue involves the relationship between BARI, and particularly the RTF, to county/city continuum of care boards. At the time BARI was created, Bay Area county and city continuum-of-care boards were less organized than they are today. HUD’s requirement of continuum-of-care plans has stimulated growth of a subregional county/city structure for homeless decision making during the last three+ years. Since the continuum-of-care committees represent agencies and nonprofits that control the bulk of homeless funds and are mandated to coordinate activities among programs at the county level, they have emerged as major homeless stakeholders.
County and city representatives now constitute a majority of the RTF. Many of these local government representatives wear two hats. They serve on both their continuum-of-care board and the RTF. It does not appear to be necessary to change the composition of the RTF to reflect the emergence of continuum-of-care boards.
The RSC is an open and inclusive organization that affords a wide variety of homeless organizations an opportunity to meet, share information, and develop policy. Close to forty participants meet every other month. There is no reason to change the RSC.
The four institutional partners-HomeBase, RCCC, ABAG, and the Northern California Grantmakers Taskforce on Homelessness-are established institutions with successful track records. They appear to have functioned well in the initiative. HomeBase has catalyzed many regional homeless projects during the last fifteen years and was the prime mover behind the regional initiative. ABAG is the region’s council of governments (COG). RCCC developed out of the United Way and prior to assuming management of BARI projects managed the large amount of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) money which came into the region after the Loma Prieta earthquake. The Northern California Grantmakers Task Force on Homelessness has existed for more than a decade. Their grants helped start many of the institutions which have coalesced into the BARI regional project collaboratives and their thinking has helped shape regional homeless policy. Periodic independent evaluation might suggest changes in the structure such as dropping one or more institutional partner or substituting one organization for another.
For the time being the existing BARI system is working. Leaving things as they are with no change in the governance structure is a viable option. Other choices are for BARI to defer changes in its governance structure unless and until it receives major funding or to take a proactive position and "reinvent" itself in a way which will facilitate further growth and development now. Following is a description of what other regions have done that might inform changes in BARI’s governance structure now or in the future.
Regional Joint Powers Agreement
Local governments frequently enter into agreements regarding service provision through joint powers agreements. For example a county might obtain trash collection from a city for a contiguous area of unincorporated county land under terms specified in a joint powers agreement (JPA) between the county and the city. The legal basis for the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG) is a JPA.
Los Angeles County and cities within the county have entered into a joint powers agreement to provide coordinated homeless services on a regional basis through a homeless services authority: the Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority (LAHSA).[71]
A possible alternative form for responding to homelessness on a regional basis in the Bay Area is to create a new JPA based more or less closely on the LAHSA model.
A summary of LAHSA is contained in Appendix C. Based on this review creation of a new JPA at the regional level to govern regional homeless activities does not appear desirable. The politically appointed LAHSA governing board appears less suitable to the Bay Area political culture than the RTF.
LAHSA is a single county/city entity (albeit for a region with 9.7 million people). It was mandated by settlement of litigation. LAHSA is governed by five Los Angeles county commissioners and five city council members from cities within LA county. LAHSA initially had an annual budget of $5 million for five years from city and county funds: most of which are from specified grant funds and pre-existing programs. It received a $20 million HUD regional innovative initiatives grant in 1995, which has been entirely spent. LAHSA now manages the LA continuum of care SuperNOFA funding application process: it is essentially a large, mandated, county/city continuum of care board.
The eleven-county/city continuum-of-care boards in the BARI region would not willingly relinquish their power to one regional board with the powers that LAHSA has. Centralization of decision-making authority in the hands of a small number of local elected officials runs counter to the Bay Area culture.
LAHSA does provide a precedent for establishing a regional homeless services authority. Creating a Bay Area Homeless Services Authority which borrows the idea of a homeless services authority based on a JPA from LAHSA, but adapts its structure and culture to local conditions could be a next step in the evolution of Bay Area regional homeless activities. Such an entity might be named the Bay Area Regional Homeless Services Authority (BARHSA).
Of the infinite variety of possible forms BARHSA might take one merits particular consideration-establishment of a homeless services authority as a part of ABAG itself. The next section discusses this possibility.
ABAG Homeless Affiliate and 501(c)(3) Corporation
ABAG itself was created by a JPA. It is already a BARI institutional partner and collaborates with the initiative. LAHSA did not involve their council of governments (SCAG) in the same role. If joint action through a nine-county JPA is to take place, collaboration with ABAG itself appears superior to creating a new JPA. ABAG staff and individual members of the RSC and RTF interviewed for this study were open to the possibility of a closer relationship or institutional redefinition between BARI and ABAG. The latter perceived benefits of a closer association with the formal COG for the region, but also advantages to retaining the autonomy and looser political culture of BARI as it now exists. This suggests that if a JPA is to be developed it should be careful to retain positive features of the existing system.
In addition to its general-purpose functions, ABAG has developed a system of "affiliates" in which member governments collaborate to execute projects of mutual interest or obtain services efficiently at the least cost. An example is the regional trails affiliate in which some Bay Area governments which are involved in efforts to create a regional trail around San Francisco Bay collaborate to make the trail a reality. Only those governments through which a portion of the trail might pass chose to be affiliated in this particular project. Other ABAG affiliates have been established to facilitate joint purchases of electricity and gas, do estuary planning, and help cities get group liability insurance.
In order to manage funding to implement affiliate projects ABAG has established affiliate-specific tax-exempt 501(c)(3) corporations. The boards of directors of the current ABAG affiliate 501(c)(3) corporations are local elected officials.
An alternative governance structure for long-term homeless activities in the Bay Area might be to have ABAG create an ABAG regional homeless affiliate organization with an associated 501(c)(3) corporation. Policy-making and grants management would move from the BARI structure to a type of legal and governance structure parallel to those for some other regional activities. This would move activities more into the orbit of established regional government. ABAG’s established financial management controls might appeal to governmental and foundation funders. An important issue to resolve is the composition of the governing board of a 501(c)(3) corporation. Local elected officials govern the other ABAG 501(c)(3) corporations. ABAG and the RTF would need to negotiate an acceptable board composition. Since Monterey and Santa Cruz counties are in the BARI region, but not the ABAG region, arrangements with these two counties would have to be worked out.
Regional Homeless Trust Fund
Many cities, counties, and States, and one sub-region have established "trust funds" for housing. Nonprofit trusts like the Trust for Public Land have been set up independent of governments and their boards of directors act as decision-makers for public-serving activities. A possible governance model for BARI is a Regional Homeless Trust established by local governments or, alternatively, a private, non-governmental trust.
In contrast to the well-developed web of existing housing trust funds there are only a few examples of homeless trust funds. There is no comprehensive list of existing homeless trust funds, but Mary Brooks at the Center for Community Change’s Housing Trust Fund project and individul RSC and RTF members identified some. Miami-Dade County has established a regional homeless trust fund described in Appendix C. Alameda County has established a homeless trust fund, funded as a social service item in the County budget. The States of Georgia, Wisconsin, and Nebraska and St. Louis, Jefferson, and St. Charles county, Missouri have established homeless trust funds.[72] BARI has created a regional homeless housing trust fund for homeless housing (BayFund).
The experience of housing trust funds is instructive concerning administrative structure, potential revenue sources, and policy for a potential Bay Area homeless trust fund. Mary Brooks, Director of the Washington, D.C.-based Center for Community Change Housing Trust Fund Project is the national expert on housing trust funds. Her Guide to Developing a Housing Trust Fund, Status Report on Housing Trust Funds in the United States, Summary of Revenue Sources Committed to Existing Housing Trust Funds, Housing Trust Fund Project website, and Quarterly newsletter, News from the Housing Trust Fund Project [73] provide helpful information and policy guidance for homeless trust fund funding and governance issues.
According to the results of a 1996 Housing Trust Fund Project survey
of all state, county, and city housing trust funds there were 106 housing
trust funds in the United States. The study identified thirty-three State,
39 county, and 34 city housing trust funds. California has a housing trust
fund. Four states have more than one housing trust fund. In the Seattle
area eight cities and one county have established a sub-regional housing
trust fund called ARCH, which is described in Appendix
C. The number of housing trust funds continues to grow.[74]
Table 8 shows the various revenue sources used to fund housing trust funds
in the United States.
Table 8 |
|||
|
|
Using Source |
Using Source |
Using Source |
| Impact/mitigation (linkage) fees |
|
|
|
| Zoning inclusionary in-lieu fees |
|
||
| Property taxes |
|
||
| Developer proffers (contributions) |
|
|
|
| Housing excise tax |
|
||
| Sales tax |
|
|
|
| Hotel room tax |
|
||
| Condominium conversions fees |
|
||
| Unclaimed utility deposits |
|
||
| Landfill fees |
|
||
| Transfer of development rights |
|
||
| Union employees wages |
|
||
| Real Estate Transfer Tax |
|
|
|
| Penalty on failure to pay RE tax |
|
||
| Mortgage transfer tax |
|
||
| Interest from real estate escrow |
|
||
| Interest from title escrow |
|
||
| Interest from rental deposits |
|
||
| Unclaimed property fund |
|
||
| Document recording fees |
|
|
|
| Mobile home owner fees |
|
||
| Securities Act cash fund fees |
|
||
| Other financing fees |
|
||
| Bond reserve accounts |
|
||
| Capital budgets |
|
||
| General obligation bonds |
|
||
| Appropriations only |
|
||
| Capitalization funds only |
|
||
| Restaurant tax |
|
||
| MCC/MRB fees |
|
||
| Condominium conversion tax |
|
||
| Real Estate Excise tax |
|
||
| No funding source |
|
||
| Other fees |
|
|
|
In the Bay Area Alameda, Napa, San Mateo, and Santa Clara counties and the cities of Berkeley, Cupertino, Morgan Hill, Palo Alto, Menlo Park and San Francisco have established housing trust funds. Other Bay Area communities are considering establishing housing trust funds.
Many housing trust funds receive funding from more than one source. Some have changed their funding source(s) over time. Several cities have received contributions to pre-existing housing trust funds after the funds were set up. Permitted uses for housing trust fund money vary widely. Because this is flexible funding, housing trust fund moneys are frequently used for "gap financing" to cover costs that other sources will not cover. Some local jurisdictions use housing trust funds for matching funds to secure federal HOME or other funding.
The amount of funding housing trust funds have varies greatly. Cumulatively it is substantial. As of 1997 The Housing Trust Fund Project reported that the amount of dedicated revenues collected by individual city housing trust funds each year ranged from $75,000 to $8,000,000. County housing trust funds received as little as $50,000 and as much as $14,000,000 a year. Seventeen State housing trust funds receive more than $1,000,000 a year. Florida’s State housing trust fund receives $120,000,000 a year.[75]
The Bay Area has regional affordable housing builders like LIHF and BRIDGE capable of developing affordable housing projects of regional significance for homeless and formerly homeless people. BARI has established a regional trust fund to fund housing for homeless and formerly homeless people: BayFund. BayFund was not able to finance any homeless housing project during its three year existence and the balance of BayFund funding has been reprogrammed to other BARI projects. The BayFund collaborative is being restructured. It appears that the standards necessary to qualify a new development as sufficiently regional for BayFund funding were too high for developers to meet, at least in the short time frame of the BARI initiative. Revised standards, a longer lead time, and a new lead agency should result in more BayFund projects being successfully completed.
The BayFund experience involved construction of permanent housing which is always difficulty and time consuming. A homeless trust fund might fund a variety of homeless social service activities which face fewer start-up barriers. Many regional homeless activities have shorter time frames than housing development projects.
The Dade-Miami County precedent for establishing a regional homeless trust fund is important and the rapid rise of housing trust funds provides guidance concerning how a homeless trust fund might be created and nurtured. BARI should consider creating a homeless trust fund to coordinate multi-source funding for regional projects.
Regional Homeless Endowment
One visionary idea for regional homeless activities is to establish an endowment to fund homeless programs in perpetuity.
Money to fund public-serving activities in perpetuity from the interest, earnings, or repayment from a revolving fund on an initial amount of funding has been made available for housing, education, arts, environmental and other purposes. Donations to an endowment may be attractive to donors because of the perpetual character of the endowment.
Several existing city housing trust funds have established endowments. Denver, Colorado sold urban renewal land and San Antonio, Texas sold a city-owned cable TV franchise to fund their housing trust funds. Both cities rely on interest, earnings, and repayment from loans from the initial funding to maintain their funds in perpetuity. North Carolina’s housing trust fund received $19.7 million in Stripper Well Oil Overcharge funds and uses more than $1 million in interest on this money annually without depleting the principal.[76]
The experience of San Antonio and North Carolina suggests that a large, one-time infusion of capital can be important to get an endowment going. If BARI were to receive one large one-time amount of money from a source that permitted its use as an endow-ment it might be desirable to launch a regional homeless endowment. However, it is not legally necessary to have a large amount to start an endowment. BARI might use one or more small contributions as the basis for starting an endowment that they expect to grow or even establish an endowment to receive funding before any money is available.[77]
A Bay Area Regional Continuum-of-Care Plan?
The three other regions which received innovative initiatives grants-Miami-Dade County, Los Angeles, and Denver-now each prepare a SuperNOFA to HUD with a single regional continuum-of-care plan. Since the Miami-Dade County and Los Angeles initiatives involve a single county and the cities within it, they are doing what other Bay Area counties and the cities within them now do on a county-by-county basis. Denver, however, is an example of a metropolitan region in which multiple counties (six) and multiple cities (seven) have developed a single regional continuum-of-care plan and are submitting a single regional SuperNOFA to HUD. While MDHI has undoubtedly facilitated interjurisdictional collaboration, the extent to which MDHI has succeeded in forging a true regional continuum-of-care plan rather than packaging a series of programs together must await a full independent evaluation.
Theoretically a single, integrated regional continuum of care plan for the entire BARI region might produce a level of coordination and economies of scale that would make it superior to eleven county-based continuum of care plans. However, in practice, the 11 county/117 city BARI region is too large and politically complex for this to work well. Bay Area county/city continuum-of-care boards have just created continuum-of-care plans for their areas during the last three years. The boards have emerged as important decision-makers. An attempt now by BARI to create a unitary continuum-of-care plan for the region would be counter-productive. This might produce a sham plan in which existing programs are combined on paper, but in which federal funds are really passed through based on county/city level decisions. It would certainly produce conflict.
Attempting to create a single Bay Area continuum-of-care plan does not appear to be possible or desirable at the present time. BARI should continue its important roles as a forum for information sharing and to informally broker coordinated efforts, but not try to supplant county/city continuum-of-care planning.
Sub-regional Homeless Planning and Programs
Local governments in the Bay Area have been resistant to a new over-arching regional planning and governance structure for the Bay Area. Major campaigns to create regional planning and/or government for the Bay Area failed in 1912, 1932, 1972[78], and most recently in the Bay Vision 2020 effort in 1990.[79] Bay Area governments have been more receptive to sub-regional planning, particularly where it has percolated up from the local governments themselves. Subregions may be several adjacent cities and local agencies, one county and the cities and local agencies within it, or an area that crosses county boundaries.
ABAG has funded six recent subregional planning efforts around land use, coastal management, economic development, and airport access planning. The ABAG subregional planning projects are: (a) Tri-Valley planning between Alameda and Contra Costa Counties and the cities of Dublin, Danville, Livermore, Pleasanton, and San Ramon, (b) planning in Sonoma county focused on bikeways, housing, and revenue sharing, (c) a joint revitalization plan between the cities of Oakland and San Leandro focused on coordinated physical and landscape improvements to develop areas around the Oakland airport, (d) coastal planning in San Mateo County between the cities of Pacifica and Half Moon Bay and adjacent unincorporated communities, (e) planning in South Napa County between Napa county and the cities of American Canyon and Napa focused on agricultural and urban land use and economic development, (e) economic development planning between several Solano county cities, Solano county, and the Solano Economic Development Corporation (SEDCORP).[80]
A Regional Collaborative for Housing (ARCH) in the Seattle area has gone further. There one county and seven cities have entered into a joint powers agreement to pool housing funds (including funds used for homeless housing) into a single trust fund and to jointly plan and allocate the funds. ARCH is described in greater detail in Appendix C.
As the entity in the Bay Area specifically charged with promoting cross-jurisdictional efforts, BARI is the appropriate vehicle to promote cross-jurisdictional homeless planning and programming. BARI might promote one or more subregional collaborations with homelessness as the focus. Combining BARI’s homeless network and ABAG’s experience with subregional planning might be particularly effective.
While the 1995 BARI Collaborative Plan and Appendix is the result of a substantial planning process and the principles it contains proved essential in shaping the initiative, the plan is out of date. A good deal of new information about Bay Area homelessness has been generated by Bay Area continuum-of-care plans since the plan was written. Homeless practice has continued to evolve. LAHSA’s Strategic Plan and Miami-Dade county’s Long-Term Homeless Plan, both adopted in 1998, provide up-to-date models of regional homeless strategic plans which can inform a new BARI strategic planning process. ABAG staff are capable of careful and credible data collection and analysis and have the capacity to do regional homeless planning. BARI might consider a new planning process to create an updated regional homeless strategic plan. This should not be a cobbled-together laundry list of existing continuum of care plans for the eleven-county BARI region. But it could formulate standards, goals and objectives, and action strategies based on the best Bay Area practices and practices of other regions. ABAG planning staff trained in planning and analysis might contribute systematic data on regional homeless attributes, programs, funding levels, and outcomes to the extent that this is possible and BARI determines that the contribution of such work justifies the expense.
Governance Recommendations
The Bay Area can learn from the experience of Los Angeles, Dade-Miami County, Denver, and Seattle’s ARCH project. Creating a regional homeless authority and a regional trust fund and endowment might contribute to Bay Area regional homeless programs in the long run. So might encouraging sub-regional homeless planning where appropriate. A single continuum-of-care plan for the entire BARI region does not appear to be feasible or desirable. However, BARI should continue to monitor the experience of the Miami-Dade county, Denver, and Los Angeles regional continuum-of-care plans and learn from their successes and failures.
During a very short period of time BARI launched eight regional projects. These quickly ramped up and were spending in excess of $3 million a year before Draconian cuts as the grant period neared an end. HomeBase has a goal of raising $10 million a year for 10 years to take BARI projects to scale.
Other regions with regional homeless programs provide some context for understanding funding for regional homeless programs. Miami-Dade County with about half the Bay Area population spent a little over $13 million a year during 1997-98 on regional homeless activities from food and beverage tax revenue and HUD homeless initiative funds.[81] Los Angeles with about a third more population spent about $15 million a year in regional homeless activities from a combination of funds dedicated to the authority by the JPA which created it and HUD innovative initiative funds during the same period.[82] Denver, with less than a third of the population of the Bay Area, spent about $2.5 million a year on regional homeless program activities from HUD innovative initiative funds during 1997-98.[83] MDHI is currently applying for a $13.4 million HUD grant in the current SuperNOFA process. Because each region has additional homeless funding from other local government and nonprofit sources these figures do not represent all homeless funding in the respective regions. They do provide an indication of how much funding these regions have devoted to homeless programs on a regional basis.
BARI should consider establishing a homeless authority-The Bay Area Regional Homeless Services Authority (BARHSA). But the authority need not adopt the appointive political governance structure LAHSA has. BARI should build on both ABAG strengths and the particular BARI culture. If BARHSA did come into existence the existing RTF and RSC might become the board of directors and advisory committee for the new entity. The existing institutional partners might continue similar functions. And the existing BARI projects would be a springboard for the future.
BARHSA might adopt a legal structure for both a regional homeless trust fund and a regional homeless endowment governed by the RTF. This might even be done before funding is available. Creating a new structure and launching a campaign for an endowment might help move the regional homeless agenda forward.
Staffing a Campaign to Institutionalize Long-Term
Funding for Bay Area Regional Homeless Programs
Securing long-term financing for Bay Area Regional homeless programs from one or more of the sources discussed in this report and/or establishing a new governance structure for regional homeless programs will require long-term, hard, and focused effort.
BARI has built up a remarkable regional network of organizations and individuals who collectively have enormous expertise in a wide range of areas related to homelessness from overcoming Nimbyism to creating computer networks; from counseling runaway youth to training homeless people for work. Many of the individuals involved with BARI have organizing and political skills. The existing RTF and RSC structures are excellent existing incubators for innovation. They have the capacity to formulate campaign(s) to seek long-term funding for Bay Area regional homeless programs.
Any campaign(s) to seek long-term funding for Bay Area Regional Homeless Programs needs core staff to facilitate decision-making so that a clear action agenda for pursuing one or more of the sources discussed above is decided upon. Staff is necessary to perform the work to carry out campaign(s) to institutionalize long-term financing-organizing meetings, preparing testimony, advocating for change, and identifying and mobilizing experts and external support. This report can help launch and inform this effort, but it is not a substitute for staff work to implement change.
It is unlikely that BARI can obtain long-term regional homeless funding relying on purely volunteer effort or with just existing staff. RSC and RTF participants are very busy working professionals. The more senior participants best able to undertake campaign(s) to secure long-term financing for regional homeless programs tend to be the busiest. While the RSC Sustainability Working Group and the RTF through a sub-committee or as a whole might develop one or more campaign(s) to secure long-term funding core staff to mount the campaign(s) is essential.
Funding could support an existing BARI staff person, permitting him or her to shift responsibility away from other pressing concerns to direct efforts to obtain long-term funding. Alternatively it could permit BARI to hire one or more new staff persons for this role. The role requires at least one person with organizational, political, and advocacy skills, knowledge of State and local government and homeless programs, and a background in successfully leading campaign(s) to achieve public policy change.
A core staff person might work with experts from existing BARI projects. If, for example, BARI chose to work on getting more TISA funds allocated to homeless housing CASC staff might be best equipped to do that. If they decide to try to change state law so that unclaimed assets of people who die in state mental institutions go to support housing programs for people with mental disabilities they might draw on BARI HHISN staff.
Funding to pursue long-term regional homeless funding can be most effective if a core staff person has flexible funding to pay for some expert legal and consulting help at critical junctures. Someone who has worked on the tobacco litigation might provide helpful advice if BARI pursues tobacco settlement funds. Expert legal advice on Article XIII issues would be essential before launching a real estate transfer tax campaign. Advice from the Center for Community Change Housing Trust Fund Project would be very helpful if BARI launches a trust fund campaign.
If long-term funding efforts focus on State-level legislative change it would be essential for BARI to have advice from someone based in Sacramento who is knowledgeable about State legislative advocacy. Probably the most cost-effective way to do that would be to hire someone in an existing Sacramento-based poverty/advocacy organization to work with BARI staff.
A final recommendation of this report is that BARI allocate funding from existing BARI funds or seek foundation support for a campaign to institutionalize long-term funding.
In the mid-1990’s Bay Area foundations correctly perceived that they alone could not provide the level of resources necessary to raise homeless programs they had started to scale. The foundations made a decision to fund staff time to help Bay Area communities develop requests for federal funding. This turned out to be a very successful strategy. A modest amount of foundation funding for staff to develop proposals and see them through did in fact lead to major federal funding for Bay Area homeless programs, including the BARI initiative itself. Today federal support for homeless programs is in question. Foundations would be well advised to provide funding to staff the next stage in the evolution of Bay Area homeless programs-institutionalization of long-term, non-federal, non-foundation funds.
Support for BARI to conduct a serious campaign to institutionalize long-term regional homeless funding should support at least a full time senior staff person with additional funds to pay staff of existing BARI projects, consultants and for legal advice. A campaign to secure long-term Bay Area homeless funding would also require support for associated phone, mailing, travel, printing, and related costs.
Appendix A: The Bay Area Regional Initiative (BARI)